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COMMENTARY/How to Succeed by Failing
ROBERT L. WRIGHT*
On January 31, 1968, Chief Judge James A. Walsh, sitting in the United
States District Court in Tucson, Arizona, decided that newspapers are not
sacred cows and, like most business enterprises in this country, may not
agree to fix prices and pool profits. The case, United States v. Citizen Pub-
lishing Co.,' had nationwide consequences because the kind of agreement
used in Tucson had been used by competing newspapers to maintain adver-
tising monopolies in 21 other substantial metropolitan areas for many years.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court on March 10, 1969,2 and the
shock waves are still traveling through the newspaper industry. The mere
filing of the suit by the Justice Department in 1965 caused the initial tremor
and resulted in the introduction of a Failing Newspaper Bill in the 90th
Congress3 which would have exempted such newspaper advertising agree-
ments from the antitrust laws. The subsequent adverse district court and
Supreme Court decisions produced the similar, soon to be enacted, News-
paper Preservation Bill, 4 which would overturn those decisions. This com-
mentary will show how a commendable exhibition of judicial independence
in dealing with a powerful communications medium has provoked a weak-
kneed response in the legislative and executive departments.
The District Court Condemns
In 1940, Tucson was a city of 100,000 people with two daily newspapers,
the evening Arizona Star and the morning Arizona Citizen. Although their
circulation was about even, the Citizen was losing money and the Star was
* A.B., Cornell, 1925; J.D., John Marshall Law School, 1930; First Assistant,
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 1961-65; Member, District of
Columbia and Maryland bars.
1. 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968).
2. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
3. S. 1312, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4. S. 1520, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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making it; but nobody was getting rich. The owner of the Star saw a way to
benefit both papers, without fighting for added circulation or advertising
revenue, by duplicating in Tucson an agreement that had proved successful
in El Paso, Texas. He proposed an arrangement under which each paper
would retain its own editorial staff but combine the business operations.
The operating agreement provided for production of both papers in a single
plant, combined circulation and advertising departments, and shared profits
at a fixed ratio. Although the operating economies of this arrangement were
modest, the added income from the ensuing advertising monopoly was sensa-
tional. The combined before tax profits of the two papers climbed from less
than $28,000 in 1940 to more than $1,725,000 in 1964.1 This increase was
partly due to added circulation resulting from the doubling of Tucson's popu-
lation.6 However, as the district court found, 75 percent of all newspaper
income comes from advertising. The price per inch of their advertising rose
from $0.55 to $1.827 over that period and with this added income the papers
became an outstanding financial success.
In 1965 an out of state publisher offered the owner of the Star $10 million
for his paper provided, of course, that the agreement with the Citizen, which
pooled profits and fixed advertising prices, remained in effect. At that time
the owner of the Citizen, the pre-1940 money loser, himself exercised his
right under the Star-Citizen agreement to buy the Star for $10 million.
Upon his proposal to merge the two papers, the Justice Department brought
suit to enjoin the merger as a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.8
The complaint also charged that the price fixing and profit sharing provisions
of the 1940 agreement violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.9 The
Star and Citizen merged on the same day the Government's plea to delay the
merger pending trial was denied. 10
At trial, one aspect of the defense, in addition to the anticipated argu-
ment that the papers had no advertising monopoly because they faced televi-
sion and radio competition, was especially noteworthy. The defense called
as an expert witness a newspaper broker who had formulated in other cities
a number of operating agreements similar to the Tucson agreement. This
5. 280 F. Supp. at 982. Finding 37 specifically states that "[dluring the period
1940 through 1964, the combined revenues of Star and Citizen have increased each
year, excepting only in 1942." Id.
6. Although Tucson's population increased, the papers' combined circulation per
living unit fell from .85 in 1940 to .80 in 1964. Id. at 988. If more subscriptions
per household means better reader service, these papers did not even hold their own.
Instead of succeeding, both were failing by this public interest standard.
7. Id. at 989, Finding 130.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
10. 280 F. Supp. at 983, Finding 52.
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expert attempted to persuade the court that no one except an unprofitable
newspaper's direct competitor would buy its assets no matter how much cir-
culation it might have.
The district court was easily persuaded that no reasonable businessman
would sell his losing paper for the low price it would bring from a purchaser
who would have to survive by competitive merit, if the loser could join
with his only competitor to exploit a lucrative newspaper advertising
market. The conversion of the Citizen from a newspaper loser in 1940 to a
$10 million newspaper buyer in 1965 was an obvious case in point. The
district court may also have observed the penchant of newspaper owners
for subsidizing newspaper losses from other sources of income, simply because
they like the public influence a newspaper provides. In any event, the court
found that the Citizen would not have gone out of business, absent the 1940
operating agreement with the Star," and held the agreement illegal. More
importantly, the court found that: the two papers' advertising and net oper-
ating revenues had greatly increased during the period 1956-64; 12 the market,
Pima County, was substantial; 13 and the monopolized product, daily news-
paper advertising, was unique.14 The competition was direct and Section 7
of the Clayton Act was plainly violated by the merger. The price fixing and
profit pooling provisions of the operating agreement were voided and divest-
iture of the Star by the owner of the Citizen was ordered. An appeal to the
Supreme Court by the defendants promptly followed.
The Supreme Court Affirms
The El Paso idea had spread far beyond Tucson. There were 42 other news-
paper owners with similar operating agreements in 21 cities, including cities
as large as Pittsburgh and San Francisco and as far apart as Miami and
Honolulu. Because of the wide effect which an affirmance of the de-
cision would have, the American Newspaper Publishers Association filed
an amicus brief, as did newspaper owners with similar joint operating agree-
ments in 14 other cities. These friends of the Court were not prepared to
associate freedom of the press with free enterprise in the newspaper business.
The gist of their argument was that commercial competition between daily
newspapers was so unprofitable that the only practical choice came down
to single ownership of all the daily papers in a city or separate ownership
with an operating agreement that would relieve them of this competitive
11. Id. at 980, Finding 17.
12. Id. at 991-92, Findings 173-75.
13. Id. at 992, Findings 182-89.
14. Id. at 985, Findings 68-71.
19691
Catholic University Law Review
hardship. 15 Only in this way could the public have the benefit of the diverse
editorial opinions and news coverage that diverse ownership of newspapers
makes possible. According to the newspaper publishers, the rule of reason
should therefore accommodate a holding that such agreements do not violate
the antitrust laws. Carried to its logical limits, this argument rejecting com-
mercial competition as determining newspaper survival would lead to regula-
tion of newspapers as public utilities. Apparently, these publishers regarded
their own survival, rather than the survival of newspapers distinguished by
public service, as a social goal more worthy of consideration by the Court.
Their argument nevertheless raised important policy questions that should
have received some attention from the Supreme Court. Is a community
necessarily better served by the separate editorial voices of two owners who
have eliminated commercial competition than by single ownership of two
papers? A single owner can also gain maximum circulation by letting his
afternoon paper appeal to Democrats and his morning paper cater to Re-
publicans, or vice versa. Indeed, every large metropolitan daily seeks max-
imum circulation by carrying columnists with opposing views. But is the kind
of journalistic ventriloquism provided by two economically united publishers,
speaking with different voices, the free speech equivalent of economically
clashing newspaper owners? Unfortunately, these questions were ignored in
Mr. Justice Douglas' brief majority opinion.. It simply assumed that news-
paper enterprises are subject to the antitrust laws and rejected the policy ar-
gument for a judicial exemption of newspapers without mentioning it. The
majority opinion merely noted that Congress had not passed the exemption
bills.' 6
An oddity of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizen Publishing is that it
treats the 1940 operating agreement as if it were a merger, apparently to
clarify a "failing company" doctrine that was scarcely in the case. Thus,
instead of an opinion dealing with the legality of a 1965 acquisition of one
profitable newspaper by another, the Court discussed an entirely theoretical
1940 merger between the two papers. This happened despite the Court's
insistence that it renders no advisory opinions and decides only the questions
it must settle to dispose of a case.17 The only issue the Court actually had to
decide was whether the district court had correctly held that the 1965
acquisition of the Star by the owner of the Citizen violated Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that both papers were
15. Brief for American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae at 70,
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
16. 394 U.S. at 138-39 n.4.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
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financially sound immediately prior to the acquisition.18 Since they were
the only daily papers in a substantial, rapidly growing city, the acquisition
seemed to be a clear suppression of competition condemned by Section 7,
the antimerger provision of the Clayton Act. Yet, Mr. Justice Stewart dis-
sented because he thought the case should be remanded to the district court
to reconsider whether the Citizen was or was not a failing enterprise in
1940.19 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the six man majority, said that the
Citizen did not meet the requirements of a "failing company" in 1940 as
that term is used in antitrust merger cases.20 Discussion of the "failing com-
pany" defense was hardly necessary, since there was no claim that either
paper was failing when they merged in 1965, but his rejection of this defense
dominated the majority opinion. Discussion of the "failing company" de-
fense, moreover, followed a declaration that the 1940 joint operating agree-
ment's price fixing and profit sharing provisions made it a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.21
How did a case involving a merger of two financially healthy competitors
become a "failing company" case? The argument that provoked this result
is difficult to understand, but is as follows: Instead of making a joint operat-
ing agreement in 1940 that merged their business departments and gave them
a newspaper advertising monopoly, the respective owners of the two papers
might have produced the same kind of restraint of competition by merging
the ownership of the two papers. Therefore, the 1940 operating agreement
should be analyzed for antitrust enforcement purposes as if it were the 1965
merger agreement.
This argument is the kind of conceptual thinking about business problems
that is taught in our most respected law schools and was taken seriously by
the Justice Department. No one but a lawyer whose mind has been honed
to a fine edge would argue that a 1965 acquisition of one competitor by
another could be defended on the ground that one of them was failing in
1940. Common sense tells us that if a failing condition is to justify a 1965
merger the relevant evidence would concern what happened after 1960, not
twenty years before. In this instance, however, the Supreme Court, which
is frequently criticized for its common sense approach to antitrust cases, went
out of its way to dispose of a factually nonexistent "failing company" defense.
The Court did not, of course, center its decision around this "failing com-
pany" argument simply because skilled lawyers on both sides made and an-
swered it. The Supreme Court does not take cases to decide what lawyers
18. 394 U.S. at 142.
19. Id. at 145-46.
20. Id. at 138-39.
21. Id. at 134-35.
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choose to argue but to declare what the Court deems to be important princi-
ples of law. The issue apparently thought most worthy of consideration here
was whether a "failing company" defense may be made by expert opinion,
as Mr. Justice Stewart said it could, 22 or whether an actual effort to sell to a
noncompetitor or to reorganize the failing enterprise must be made. The
majority of the Court decided that the latter was needed. 23 Only Mr. Justice
Harlan preferred not to deal with the question, 24 but even he did not choose
to decide a 1965 merger case on current evidence. He insisted on analyzing
the operating agreement as if it were a merger, but avoided the "failing com-
pany" argument by focusing on the 1953 renewal of the agreement, when
both papers were in a sound condition, instead of the 1940 original negotia-
tion, when one was in shaky financial condition. The eight voting Justices
thus assumed that an operating agreement could be treated as a merger.
The businessmen who made the agreement did not confuse contractual
arrangements with changes in ownership. The business consideration that
prompted the merger in 1965 was a threatened purchase of the Star by inter-
ests regarded as undesirable partners by the Citizen ownership. Instead of
being the business equivalent of the 1965 merger, the 1940 agreement was
actually only a motivating circumstance. The use of such legal fictions by
judges as an aid to the declaration of legal principles has been a leading fea-
ture of Anglo-American law for a good many centuries. Abstruse arguments
that lawyers deem persuasive will also continue to be made even if their
actual effect is only to widen for judges the choice of decisional grounds.
And the fate of this spurious "failing company" argument in the Supreme
Court did not deter the newspaper publishers from resting their Newspaper
Preservation Bill on equally specious grounds.
The Congress Threatens Reversal
The arguments made for the Newspaper Preservation Bill at congressional
hearings may be summarized as follows: (1) most of the 21 advertising,
price fixing, and profit pooling agreements in other cities had been in effect
for a long time without a challenge from the Justice Department; 25 (2) if
these agreements were terminated, one of the two newspapers involved in
each city would not be able to continue publication on a competitive basis;2 6
22. Id. at 143-44.
23. Id. at 137-38.
24. Id. at 141-43.
25. Hearings on S. 1520 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 1520]; S. REP. No. 535, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
26. Hearings on S. 1520, at 151; S. REP. No. 535, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969).
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and (3) in order to keep these papers in existence the Supreme Court's
Citizen Publishing decision must be overturned.
27
An amendment offered by Senator Brooke of Massachusetts 28 would allow
a future condemnation of the price fixing and profit sharing provisions of the
other 21 agreements in equity suits brought by the Justice Department. But
it would preclude antitrust suits by private plaintiffs injured by these agree-
ments, either for damages or equitable relief. This "Brooke compromise"
was supported by Assistant Attorney General McLaren, 29 the Antitrust Divi-
sion head, who opposed the outright exemption offered by the "preservation"
bill.
3 0
The Senate hearings on how to keep newspapers from failing take up
more than seven printed volumes,3 1 cover a period of three years, and are
a gold mine of information about what's wrong with our metropolitan dailies.
The pitfalls in general legislative solutions to special problems are evident
upon a brief look at San Francisco,3 2 one of the cities allegedly in need of
antitrust exemption to enjoy diverse daily news.
In San Francisco the surviving daily papers are the Examiner, published
by the extensive Hearst chain, and the Chronicle, owned by the same interests
as the leading television station, KRON. These two publishers married the
Examiner to the Chronicle by an agreement like the one made in Tucson, a
few months after the Citizen Publishing suit was brought. They disclosed
this liaison to the Justice Department and were told that the Antitrust Division
would not sue to stop them. They knew, of course, that a divorce might be
required if the government won the Citizen Publishing suit. As in Tucson,
readers in San Francisco were not told that business competition between
the two papers had been eliminated. San Francisco readers continued to
receive the benefit of such diverse news and political views as the two papers
had provided before. But those who placed classified ads were soon aware
of a sharp increase in rates. San Francisco is a large enough city to support
two competing papers. Each publisher had extraordinary additional re-
sources that would make them exceptionally strong competitors, but these
resources were cited at the hearings as tending to discourage rather than
promote competition. The Chronicle's position was that Hearst could sub-
sidize the Examiner with profits from the Hearst chain. The Examiner con-
27. Hearings on S. 1520, at 151.
28. Amendment No. 46 to S. 1520, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
29. Hearings on S. 1520, at 297.
30. Statement of Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, id. at 294.
31. Hearings on S. 1312 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on S. 1520.
32. Hearings on S. 1520, at 29-146.
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tended that KRON profits could subsidize the Chronicle. If these circum-
stances prevented fair competition between the two papers, the Chronicle
logically should be divorced from KRON and the ownership of the Examiner
should be separated from the rest of the Hearst chain. These special ad-
vantages could not legally or equitably justify the two publishers' partnership
agreement.
The founder, editor, and publisher (all one man) of the weekly San Fran-
cisco Bay Guardian claimed the reason that there was no adequate newspaper
competition in big cities was that publishers for many years had been acting
as though the antitrust laws did not apply to them. He concluded his fusillade
against the bill with the following burst:
If you plant a flower on University of California property, or
loose an expletive on Vietnam, the cops are out of the chutes like
broncos. But if you are a big publisher and you violate anti-
trust laws for years and you emasculate your competition with
predatory practices and you drive hundreds of newspapers out of
business, then you are treated as one of nature's noblemen.83
Whether the general public regards newspaper publishers as "nature's noble-
men" may be doubted but this appears to be a fair description of the way the
United States Senate treats them.
When congressional exemption from either public or private antitrust
liability is sought, the financial results thought to justify the exemption are
normally made public. It would therefore seem requisite that some or all of
the publisher-beneficiaries in the other 21 cities show precisely how they
would fail if forced to compete with each other. As we have seen, the figures
revealed in the Citizen Publishing litigation made no case at all for exemp-
tion. Yet the profit and loss figures for these other papers were submitted
to the Antitrust-Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the condition that no one but the members of the Subcommittee and their
staffs could have access to them. When the bill reached the House for hear-
ings, Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Committee alluded to this in-
formation gap by calling the bill a "pig in a poke" but expressed hope for a
compromise.84 At the Celler Committee hearings, Walter Hamilton, a rep-
resentative of the Commerce Department, supported the bill.8 5 Assistant
Attorney General McLaren repeated his opposition86 but admitted that
33. Hearings on S. 1520, at 31.
34. Hearings on H.R. 279 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1969).
35. Id. at 227.
36. Id. at 358, 361.
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Hamilton spoke for the President3 7 and that he, MeLaren, spoke only for the
Justice Department.
3 8
Spiro Agnew Meet John Mitchell!
When, on November 18, 1969, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out
the Newspaper Preservation Bill it contained two significant amendments.
First, no joint operating agreement sanctioned by the bill is to be set up
"except with the prior written consent of the Attorney General of the United
States."39 No longer need the Vice-President rail in public against the lords
of the press. Suggesting to the Attorney General in a lowered voice whose
agreements shall be approved should get the needed job done. Any dissent-
ing private citizen who questions the Attorney General's judgment will be
driven from the courts to the polls for relief. So long as Mr. Nixon's silent
majority exists, peaceful journalism will reign.
The second amendment provided that private antitrust causes of action
accruing before passage of the bill may still be prosecuted.40 The commit-
tee report states that the purpose of both these amendments is to "make it
possible for the Justice Department to regulate future agreements" and to
limit the bill's antitrust exemption for defendants in private suits to those
accruing after its passage.4 1 Senators Hart, Kennedy, Burdick, and Tydings
filed a separate statement opposing the bill as amended, 42 and Senator
Hruska filed a separate statement opposing the amendment permitting prose-
cution of existing private actions.
43
These amendments did not alter what the committee reported as the basic
purpose of the bill, i.e., to grant antitrust exemption to certain arrangements
37. Id. at 369, 380.
38. Id. at 380.
39. S. 1520, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b) (1969), as amended and reported out by
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary [hereinafter cited as S. 1520 of the Judiciary
Comm.]. Section 4(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to propose, enter into, perform, or en-
force a joint operating arrangement, not already in effect, except with the
prior written consent of the Attorney General of the United States. Prior to
granting such approval, the Attorney General shall determine that not more
than one of the newspaper publications involved in the performance of such an
arrangement was a publication other than a failing newspaper: Provided,
however, That any publication may at any time propose, enter into, perform,
or enforce an agreement with any person if such agreement was not pro-
hibited by law prior to the effective date of this Act.
40. S. 1520 of the Judiciary Comm. § 5(c):
The provisions of section 4 shall have no application to any action for the
recovery of damages brought before the date of enactment of this Act by any
party other than the United States upon a cause of action arising under any
of the antitrust laws which accrued before the date of enactment of this Act.
41. S. REP. No. 91-535, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
42. Id. at 12-14.
43. Id. at 15-18.
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
worked out between newspapers "in competitive financial difficulty." The
policy cited in support of these arrangements is that of providing failing news-
papers with the "financial security and stability necessary for independent
behavior." 44 However, this policy of independent behavior through financial
security applies only to newspapers that achieve such security through price
fixing agreements. If "related business enterprises" under common owner-
ship with the paper provide such security these enterprises must be ignored
in appraising the merits of an operating agreement. 45 Readers of the report
are supposed to assume that financial security achieved by violating the anti-
trust laws is publicly more desirable than financial security resting on a news-
paper owner's legitimate financial resources.
This committee report leaves no doubt as to the true purpose of the bill.
The publisher sponsors want from Congress a renewal of the antitrust im-
munity that they got from inaction by the Justice Department from 1933 to
1965 simply because they can make more money by violating the antitrust
laws than by complying with them. These publishers are likely to get this
bill passed only because congressmen are just as susceptible to newspaper
pressure as are other public officials. In the vast majority of congressional
districts there is heavy newspaper support and no newspaper opposition.
The legislation repealing the Tucson decision has passed in the Senate4 6
and if the Senate's conduct is any reflection of House sentiment, our repre-
sentatives will promptly do what the publishers want. Not content with the
elimination of all future damage liability for past illegal conduct provided in
the Senate bill, Senator Hruska, prior to the Senate vote, offered an amend-
ment eliminating the possibility of any recovery of substantial damages in
pending actions. 47 His amendment was specifically aimed at San Francisco,
where class suits are pending, and provides that in those suits only the in-
dividual plaintiffs (whose damage claims are insignificant) may recover.
Wiping out the claims of the injured classes represented by these plaintiffs is
an outright gift of ill-gotten gains to the San Francisco publisher defendants.
By a vote of 62 to 20 the Senate adopted the Hruska amendment48 and
thereby affirmed the bill's purpose to reward wrongdoers and punish their
victims. They voted that these publishers, who created their advertising
monopoly after the Tucson suit was filed, should be relieved of substantially
all their liability to the bilked advertisers. No other enterprises have been
44. id. at 4.
45. Id. at 5.
46. S. 1520, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See 116 CONG. REc. S 950 (daily ed. Jan.
30, 1970).
47. S. 1520, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 5(c) (1969). See 116 CONG. REC. S 889 (daily
ed. Jan. 29, 1970).
48. 116 CONG. REC. S 890 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970).
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rescued by the Congress from the adverse consequences of such a deliberately
calculated business risk.
The Antitrust Division Reverses Itself
In the meantime the Antitrust Division had filed with the district court in
Tucson a document called "Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Plan for
Modification of the Operating Agreement and for Divestiture of the Arizona
Daily Star." This document clearly told the publishers they now have nothing
to fear from the Antitrust Division, and that their problems would be solved
by the "Brooke compromise," which takes care of damage-greedy plaintiffs.
While this performance was not the first time the Antitrust Division had con-
verted a clear cut legal victory into a losing consent decree, it appears to be
the first such loss for the Nixon administration. The defendants' plan pro-
vides for modification of the operating agreement that eliminated all commer-
cial competition between the Star and the Citizen and proposes a sale of the
Star conditioned on continuance of the modified operating agreement. The
Division's response, ten pages long, gives the substance of the case away with
a striking economy of words. After citing Supreme Court decisions making
unconditional and complete divestiture the required remedy in similar cases, 49
the Antitrust Division then agrees with defendants that unconditional divesti-
ture is not required here. No reason is offered for this about-face. Instead
of responding to the defendants' proposal with a simple insistence that di-
vestiture be unconditional, leaving the existence and scope of any future
operating agreement with the Citizen up to the Star's new owner, the Anti-
trust Division is now telling the district court how two papers can retain
their existing operating agreement. The fact that this may continue to sup-
press commercial competition between the Star and Citizen is seen as rela-
tively unimportant. The key objective, according to the administration, is
that "the profitability of Star and of Citizen should, to the maximum extent
feasible, be dependent upon the performance of each." 50  Since the Supreme
Court rejected the defense that profitable competitive operation of the two
papers was not feasible, 5 the "maximum extent feasible" qualification in-
vites relitigation of the case.
The Antitrust Division recognizes that defendants are proposing to con-
tinue lessening competition between Star and Citizen "by the use of common
49. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334
(1961); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 152-53 (1948).
50. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Plan for Modification of the Operating
Agreement and for Divestiture of the Arizona Daily Star at 3, United States v. Citizen
Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Re-
sponse].
51. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969).
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advertising sales personnel. '52  It then ventures to suggest that this "should
not be approved unless the defendants are able to make a clear showing that
the economies resulting from the sharing of personnel are in whole or in part
essential to the preservation of one of the newspapers. Because plaintiff is
not satisfied that defendants can make this showing, we believe it would be
appropriate for the Court to hold a hearing on this question. '5 3 In blunter
language, defendants are invited to show that this suppression of advertising
competition should be approved if needed to preserve either the Star or the
Citizen. This is an unprecedented position for the Antitrust Division to take
with respect to such trade restraining arrangements. No authority is cited to
justify this survival test of legality. If a business enterprise cannot survive
without making a monopoly agreement with its only competitor, exit from the
business is the result contemplated by antitrust doctrine. The notion that
newspapers are exempt from this doctrine seems to have been derived from
the pending Newspaper Preservation Bill rather than existing law.
Then we learn that the Division is agreeable to the continuance of Star-
Citizen combination advertising rates. The rationale for this conclusion is
succinctly stated in a single sentence: "Since each newspaper would set its
own rate, and the combination rate would simply reflect cost savings ob-
jectively calculated, no agreement on price would be involved. '54  Com-
petitors can apparently agree on a single price for their two products without
agreeing on what the share of each will be. This is also a novel antitrust
doctrine, apparently applicable only to newspapers. Defendants also pro-
posed a formula for sharing revenues that would not reflect the actual revenue
generated by each paper. The Division's conclusion: "This is an artificial
method of allocation and, unless the defendants can establish that it is the
only practical method, it should not be approved."5 5  Anything newspaper
publishers find practical is apparently lawful; this is merely the feasibility test
again in different words. The Antitrust Division finally joins defendants in
insisting that divestiture of the Star be subject to a new owner's acceptance of
the existing joint operating agreement, as approved by the court.56
Conclusion
On January 23, 1970 Judge Walsh ordered the Star sold within 21 months.5 7
The sale is conditioned upon maintenance of the Star-Citizen operating agree-
52. Plaintiff's Response at 4.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 9-10.
57. Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1970, § A, at 7, col. 2. In any event, the House will
act this session and Judge Walsh's 21 month grace period provides ample time to over-
turn the extremely mild ultimate result of his initially strong opinion.
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ment and the Court has now held, after the evidentiary hearing suggested by
the Justice Department, that the two papers may combine their business and
advertising departments. Whether this sale and modified operating agree-
ment will result in any newspaper advertising competition in Tucson is an
interesting question unlikely to be answered. Judge Walsh could hardly
have been expected to carry the flag for free enterprise in newspaper pub-
lishing all by himself. If the Government wants to give in, there is no party
to the Tucson litigation with an interest in carrying on the fight. In the
Congress, only Senator Hart, Chairman of the Antitrust-Monopoly Subcom-
mittee, has spoken out against the Newspaper Preservation Bill in unequivocal
terms. 18 As noted above, Congressman Celler of New York has expressed
doubts but has wondered aloud why a compromise couldn't be worked out.59
Regardless of the form in which the bill is passed, newspaper publishers
will have lost whatever standing they may have had as opponents of special
interest legislation. As Mr. McLaren pointed out in his Senate testimony,
those who ask special legislation for themselves cannot argue against similar
favors for others "in an objective fashion."60
Legislative favors for communications media are now in style. Senator
Pastore of Rhode Island has introduced a bill that would relieve television
station owners of the risk of a comparative hearing when they ask for re-
newal of their licenses. 61 If you haven't noticed editorial opposition to this
bill in papers that want their joint operating agreements exempted from the
antitrust laws, don't worry. By 1984 television and the press will be one fat
family in every city and no owner will risk his money to back any conviction
he may have about anything.
58. See, e.g., Address by Senator Hart, Headline Club of Chicago, Oct. 13, 1969,
wherein he said:
In general, the newspaper industry is healthy, and the Failing Newspaper Act
was, in fact, a poverty program for the rich .... The Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act [identical to the Failing Newspaper Act] raises an awkward question
about the relationship of government to the press. To the extent that Congress
votes to protect incumbents against the judgment of the market place, it can be
said that Congress is "establishing" a press.
59. Hearings on H.R. 279, supra note 34, at 230-33.
60. Hearings on S. 1520, at 298.
61. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). It provides for renewal if the FCC finds
"upon the record and representations of the licensee" that renewal would serve the
public interest. Id. at 1. The FCC would be prohibited from making any comparative
appraisal of the licensee and another applicant unless it first determines "after a hear-
ing" that renewal would not be in the public interest. Id. at 2. In practical effect, the
bill would encourage automatic renewal..
1969]
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